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THE EUROPEAN UNION’S MIXED 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
GIACINTO DELLA CANANEA* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies dedicated to European administration reveal a recurring tendency to draw 
analogies between the constitutional structure of the European Union (EU) and that of 
federal orders (the United States, in particular).  In both types of structure, powers are 
separated rather than concentrated, thereby constituting a guarantee against an abuse 
of power, according to Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous thesis. 
However, of the numerous differences between nation states (including federal 
ones) and the European Union,1 one concerns precisely the subject of executive 
power.  The “Tableau sommaire de la constitution fédérale”2 sketched by de Toc-
queville is helpful to the work of identifying this difference, as it emphasized that the 
attributes of early American government were divided, including its executive func-
tion.  That is to say, the executive function in the United States was not an exclusive 
prerogative of the several states, as had been the case in the pre-existing confedera-
tion.  It was divided, in the sense that “le gouvernement des Etats resta le droit 
commun, le gouvernement fédérale fut l’exception.”3 
This opinion has also long prevailed in studies of the constitutional structure of the 
European Community (EC) and of the European Union.4  Its basis was two-fold.  The 
Treaty of Rome does not confer the power to execute European laws on European 
administration: except in certain cases such as competition, execution is remitted to 
the national public authorities.  In line with this choice, judicial review is within the 
jurisdiction of national judges. 
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 1. J.H.H. Weiler, Europe: The Case Against the Case for Statehood, 4 EUR. L. J. 43 (1998); see also G. 
DELLA CANANEA, L’UNIONE EUROPEA. UN ORDINAMENTO COMPOSITO (2003). 
 2. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE LA DEMOCRATIE EN AMERIQUE 185 (F. Furet ed., 1981) (1835). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Cf. G. ISAAC, DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE GENERAL 193 (3d ed. 1990). For an analogy with the British 
“indirect rule,” see IMPLEMENTING EC LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: STRUCTURES FOR INDIRECT RULE (T. 
Daintith ed., 1995). On recent trends toward decentralization, see A. von Bogdandy, Legal Equality, Legal Cer-
tainty and Subsidiarity in Transnational Economic Law—Decentralized Application of Art. 81.3 EC and WTO 
Law:Why and Why Not, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION, STUDIES IN 
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN HONOUR OF C.D. EHLERMANN 13 (A. Von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2003). 
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Nevertheless, as illustrated by the procedure for preliminary references, national 
court systems and the European judicial system are not functionally separate.5  Over 
the years, administrative power, too, has moved away from the initial model of Euro-
pean lawmaking and national implementation.  To give just well-known examples, the 
European Commission in collaboration with committees composed of national gov-
ernment representatives have adopted countless pieces of administrative rules.6  
Moreover, the EU’s decisions regarding national public budgets are taken within the 
framework of the multilateral surveillance procedure, which means that estimates and 
forecasts are submitted not only to the Commission, but also to all the national gov-
ernments represented on the Council of the European Union. 
Another trend in the administration of EU policies is that when making decisions 
in the traditional areas of EC intervention (like agriculture) and in the new ones (in-
cluding the licensing of genetically modified organisms and the licensing of drugs), 
both national authorities and either the Commission or EU agencies take part in multi-
phase processes.  These sequences of activities may be characterized more precisely 
as mixed administrative proceedings.7  They do not mirror a constitutional structure 
based on separated powers but, rather, highlight the powers’ interaction. They also 
raise new questions as far as judicial protection of individual interests is concerned. 
This became clear at the beginning of the 1990s, when an Italian agricultural firm 
challenged the validity of a Commission decision revoking the subsidies previously 
given to it.  Unexpectedly, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) 
refused to review the decision, arguing that the “real” decision lay in the initial opin-
ion of the Italian agency, in favor of revocation.8  The ECJ may be criticized for risk-
ing one of the fundamental principles of western constitutionalism: the right to judicial 
protection.9  However, the underlying problem of the change in the way public powers 
are exercised within the EU must not be overlooked. 
A primary aim of this Article, therefore, is to shed some light on administrative 
powers through an examination of mixed administrative proceedings.  Another aim is 
to try to identify the common features of mixed administrative proceedings and, at the 
same time, those which differentiate them from other types of proceedings.  Next, the 
problems that arise, not only in terms of judicial protection, but also in terms of trans-
 
 5. See generally G.F. Mancini & D. Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, 31 
COMMON MARKET L. REV. 243 (1994) (for the thesis that this constitutes the European order’s “cornerstone”); 
R. Caranta, Judicial Protection Against Member States: The Indirect Effects of Art. 173, 175 and 177, in 
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION BEFORE EUROPEAN COURTS 108 (H.W. Micklitz & N. Reich eds., 1998) (for the 
thesis that a new jus commune is emerging, at least as far as the standing of public interest bodies is concerned). 
 6. COMMITTEE GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (T. Christiansen & E. Kirchner eds., 2000). 
 7. S. Cassese, Il diritto amministrativo europeo presenta caratteri originali?, 53 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE 
DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO 35 (2003). 
 8. Curiously enough, few scholars have commented on this judgment.  See, e.g., R. Caranta, 
Sull’impugnabilità degli atti endoprocedimentali adottati dalle autorità nazionali nelle ipotesi di coamministra-
zione, FORO AMMINISTRATIVO 752-61 (1994); E. Garcia de Enterría, The Extension of the Jurisdiction of Na-
tional Administrative Courts by Community Law: The Judgement of the Court of Justice in Borelli and Article 5 
of the EC Treaty, 13 Y.B. EUR. L. 19 (1993). 
 9. TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, art. II-107, 2004 O.J. (C 130) 3; see also 
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, art. 47, Dec. 7, 2000, O.J. (C 364) 1 (2000) 
[hereinafter CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS]. 
13_CANANEA_FINAL.DOC 6/14/2005  3:44 PM 
Winter 2004] MIXED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 199 
parency and accountability, will be taken into account.  Finally, administrative pro-
ceedings will be analyzed in order to shed some light on the evolution of the legal or-
der of the European Union. 
II 
A PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIXED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
It is useful, though not uniformly applicable, to view the variety of mixed admin-
istrative proceedings as two general types: “top-down” proceedings, which end with 
measures taken by national authorities, and “bottom-up” proceedings—which end 
with measures taken by Community authorities.  This distinction is not to be under-
stood in a strict sense, however, because there also are mixed or hybrid models that 
present features typical of both types of processes. 
A. “Top-Down” Proceedings 
In top-down proceedings, the initial decision is made by European authorities.  
Among the proceedings of the first type is the one geared to granting eco-labels, 
which are EU product labels denoting compliance with environmental requirements.  
These labels serve to orient consumers toward products that have less impact on the 
environment.  To achieve this goal, two kinds of administrative activities are pro-
vided: regulation and adjudication.10  Regulation is carried out by the Commission, 
which is assisted by committees of national representatives.  Before developing its tri-
ennial work plan, the Commission must consult the EU eco-label committee—
composed of senior officers from the Member States—and consumers’ associations.  
Before establishing the criteria for granting the labels, which are placed on products 
such as lamps, detergents, washing machines, and refrigerators, and issuing consumer 
information, the Commission has the duty to consult a regulatory committee.11  Once 
the rules have been adopted and published in the Official Journal, they bind the con-
duct of private parties.  When manufacturers and importers apply to national depart-
ments for the right to display an eco-label on their products, the latter are bound to 
carry out an assessment.  They also must consult a special register and inform the 
Commission of the decisions they intend to make.12  The Commission then passes that 
information on to the other national bodies, which can present reasoned objections to 
the grant of the eco-label.  If the objections cannot be disposed of by way of informal 
consultation, the Commission makes a decision and the national department draws up 
a contract with the applicant regarding the eco-label’s conditions for use. 
 
 10. Council Regulation 1980/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 237) 1. 
 11. In the EC, secondary rules are normally adopted by the Commission on the basis of the Council’s 
delegation in collaboration with committees of national experts.  While all these committees must be consulted 
and produce opinions, some of these opinions have no binding effect (because they are issued by advisory 
committees), some produce partially binding effects (because they are issued by management committees), and 
some have binding effects, meaning that they send the decision back to the Council. 
 12. Article 7 of Council Regulation 1980/2000 provides for a variation in this procedure if the product 
concerns more than one Member State.  In such cases, the application may be made to one national organism, 
which then consults the others.  Council Regulation 1980/2000, supra note 10, art. 7, at 4. 
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Another procedure of this type involves the awarding of subsidies, compensatory 
measures, and forms of aid in agricultural policy areas such as the sugar market.  As is 
usually the case, the “basic” law (regulation) is adopted by the Council, whereas the 
Commission is responsible for the implementation, which implies the adoption of sec-
ondary rules.13  The law provides for a system that compensates “storage” expenses.  
The activity may be carried out only by firms that have been specially authorized by 
their Member State.  This measure is a declaratory one, issued by each national au-
thority but devised in such a way as to be capable of recognition by other national au-
thorities.14  A firm authorized in one Member State to engage in storage operations 
can, upon the presentation of the national determination, immediately obtain authori-
zation to engage in storage operations elsewhere.  In this and other proceedings of the 
same type (such as that concerning the financing of professional education by way of 
the European Social Fund),15 the funds are available under the budget of the EC, but 
are distributed by national, Member State authorities.  National authorities receive the 
applications, give money to producers, and request reimbursement from the Commis-
sion.  In other words, national authorities, not the Commission, are responsible for 
implementing the budget of the EC.  As a result, there is a double legal relationship.  
The first is between the EU and each Member State, and the second is between each 
Member State and the firms receiving subsidies.  Indeed, it is not the Commission, but 
national departments and agencies that carry out the checks aimed at ensuring that the 
duties and conditions attached to funding under European law are being observed.  
The Commission is responsible for checking that national authorities carry out their 
duty to monitor subsidy recipients by way of inspections performed with national ad-
ministrations.  National authorities also issue the documents testifying to the factual 
and accounting accuracy of the information set out in private parties’ applications.  
For this reason, the rules saddle the Member States with responsibility for the “right 
outcome” of such interventions,16 and, according to a consistent line of case law, na-
tional authorities bear the responsibility for recovering sums of money wrongly paid 
out.17  However, sometimes when the Commission exercises powers in managing the 
EC budget and decides that the subsidies allocated must be reduced or eliminated be-
cause of illegal behavior, a “direct relationship [arises] between the Commission and 
the contribution’s beneficiary.”18 
 
 13. Commission Regulation 314/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 50) 40; Council Regulation 1260/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 
178) 1. 
 14. Council Regulation 1260/2001, supra note 13, pmbl., § 2. 
 15. Council Decision 83/516, 1983 O.J. (L 289) 38; Council Regulation 2950/83, 1983 O.J. (L 289) 1. 
 16. See Council Decision 83/516, supra note 15, art. 2 (listing the European Social Fund’s tasks); Case C-
413/98, Directora-Geral do Departamento para os Assuntos do Fundo Social Europeu (DAFSE) v. Frota Azul, 
2001 E.C.R. I-673, para. 3. 
 17. Case C-55/91, Italy v. Commission, 1993 E.C.R. I-4813; Joined Cases C-89 & 91/86, Etoile commer-
ciale et CNTA v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 3005. 
 18. Case C-32/95, Commission v. Lisrestal, 1996 E.C.R. I-5373.  See discussion infra Part IV. B. 
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B. “Bottom-up” Proceedings 
In the second type of mixed administrative proceeding, the initial decision in the 
administrative sequence is made at the national level and the final decision rests with 
European administration. Perhaps the best known cases are those concerning the man-
agement of certain types of subsidies in the agricultural sector. Other equally interest-
ing cases regard the registration of geographical information and “appellation con-
trôlée” details for agricultural produce and other foodstuffs (with the exception of 
wines) and the appointment of the Economic and Social Committee’s members. 
The provisions governing the European olive oil market provide that the applica-
tion for financing be made by olive growers and processors to the appropriate regional 
administration (Regioni in Italy, Länder in Germany, and so on).  The regional au-
thorities conduct an initial examination of the application.  However, contrary to the 
usual administrative procedure for distributing agricultural subsidies, the regional au-
thority does not adopt the final measure.  It only formulates an opinion and sends it to 
the Commission, which issues the decision containing the list of fundable projects.  At 
first glance, therefore, it may be said that the Commission is responsible for balancing 
the EU’s and individual farmers’ interests, while the function of the national authority 
is to assist the Commission in what may be considered an activity of an auxiliary na-
ture. 
However, the ECJ made the opposite determination in a case decided in 1992, 
finding that the principal decision had been made by the national authority, not the 
Commission.19  The case concerned Oleificio Borelli, an olive oil processing firm.  In 
this case, the opinion of the regional administration (Regione Liguria) had been given 
and was favorable.  Nevertheless, when Regione Liguria obtained further information 
from other regional administrations, it modified its opinion and the Commission re-
fused funding.  Oleificio Borelli then challenged this decision.  It did not sue Regione 
Liguria in Italian courts, because jurisdiction to review EC acts rested exclusively 
with the ECJ.  A challenge before the Italian courts also would have been futile, be-
cause, under Italian administrative law, anything short of a final administrative deci-
sion is not reviewable: opinions are conceived as ancillary to the final (reviewable) 
decision.20  However, when the firm brought the case to the ECJ, the Commission ar-
gued that its decision only upheld or confirmed the national decision (i.e., the opinion) 
on the substance, without independently examining the facts, and the ECJ declined ju-
risdiction over the decision. 
Under Article 230 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC 
Treaty), only those Commission acts of “direct concern” to an individual may be chal-
lenged directly in the ECJ.21  Otherwise the individual must seek redress through his 
 
 19. Case C-97/91, Oleificio Borelli v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-6313. 
 20. 2 M.S. GIANNINI, DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO 563 (1993). Giannini is one of the few Italian scholars 
according to whom opinions (in the strict sense) must be kept distinct from binding opinions, “which are, in 
reality, decisional acts.” 
 21. This argument has been used since the early 1960s.  See, e.g., Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission, 
1963 E.C.R. 195.  The ECJ later admitted actions against regulations of direct and individual concern to some 
firms.  See, e.g., Case C-309/89, Codorniu v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-1853, para 19.  However, the ECJ has an-
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or her national courts (which, of course, may ask the ECJ to issue a preliminary refer-
ence).  Accordingly, the Commission argued that its decision was not of direct con-
cern, since it was the national opinion that denied Oleificio Borelli the subsidy.  Thus, 
the argument went, Oleificio Borelli had to proceed through the Italian courts.  The 
ECJ held in favor of the Commission.  However, the ECJ was aware of the prejudice 
caused to the applicant.  Precisely in order to limit the impact of the prejudice, the ECJ 
decided that, if an Italian judge were to refer a question to the ECJ under the prelimi-
nary reference procedure, the ECJ would issue a ruling.  Furthermore, the ECJ deter-
mined that the national judge was under a duty “to consider allowable an application 
made to this end, even if the national procedural rules do not provide for it in such a 
case.”22 
The complex allocation of powers just described is not unique.  An even more 
complex one involves the registration of geographical information and “appellation 
contrôlée.”23  The administrative decision in these cases serves a double purpose in 
that it is both informational (because elements defining the product are acquired) and 
technical.  A decision that an agricultural product or foodstuff is protected gives the 
producer legal certainty, with the further effect of creating a sort of monopoly.  Pre-
cisely for this reason, disagreements arise fairly frequently, not only between eco-
nomic operators, but also between national authorities.  Some national authorities 
wish to protect their own national, regional, or local products (e.g., Italian parmigiano 
or Greek feta).24  Other national authorities, on the other hand, oppose the registration 
of a product in an attempt to preserve the ability of their own economic operators to 
market the product using the same name and description. This implies that the Mem-
ber State assumes the interest of the producing firm or firms as its own. 
The proceeding begins with an application made by the interested party to the na-
tional department, which carries out an assessment.  Because the process is often 
lengthy, EC rules allow Member States to grant “temporary national protection.”  The 
national authority ascertains that the presuppositions and conditions provided for by 
the Community laws have been satisfied in that the product already benefits from offi-
cial protection nationally or in that it has an “exceptional reputation and renown.”  
Furthermore, it checks that the product conforms to previously established specifica-
 
nulled a judgment of the CFI that broadened the interpretation of the conditions set by the EC Treaty.  Case C-
50/00, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. I-6677; see also Case Law, Case T-177/01 
Jégo-Quéré v. Commission and C-50/00 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 141 
(2002) (see the comments by T. Corthout); M.P. Granger, Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions for 
Individuals Seeking Judicial Review of Community Acts: Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v. Commission and Unión de 
Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, 66 MOD. L. REV. 124 (2003).  An even more restrictive interpretation has 
been expressed, however, regarding actions brought by environmental associations, especially in the Green-
peace case.  Case C-321/95, Stichting Greenpeace Council v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. I-1651, 1702.  For 
critical remarks, see N. Gérard, Access to the European Court of Justice: A Lost Opportunity, 10 J. ENVTL. L. 
340 (1999). 
 22. Case C-97/91, Oleificio Borelli v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-6313. 
 23. Council Regulation 2081/92, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 1, amended by Council Regulation 535/97, 1997 O.J. 
(L 83) 3. 
 24. See e.g., Case C-108/01, Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma v. Asda Stores Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-5121. 
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tions.25  Once the assessment has been concluded, the national authority sends the ap-
plication to the Commission, which carries out a further check.  If the check has a 
positive outcome, the application is published.  There then begins a complex phase 
during which both Member States and private parties with opposing interests may in-
tervene.  The latter apply to their respective Member States, and these can oppose the 
registration.  In this phase, the Commission acts at first as a mediator, inviting the 
Member States to reach an agreement,26 and then acts to ratify it.  In the absence of an 
agreement, the Commission issues a decision conferring or denying an appellation 
controlée after submitting the proposed decision to a regulatory committee.  If the 
opinion is favorable, the decision is enacted.  If, on the other hand, the opinion is un-
favorable or simply not forthcoming, responsibility for a decision lies with the Coun-
cil, at the Commission’s proposal.  But if the Council has not decided within three 
months, Article 15 says the Commission must adopt the proposed measures. 
While product registration involves a complex decisionmaking process, that for 
appointing interest group representatives to the advisory body known as the Economic 
and Social Committee (ECOSOC) is much easier. The ECOSOC was established by 
the Treaty of Rome. It is composed of representatives from various economic and so-
cial categories as well as “representatives of the general interest.”27  It must be con-
sulted on all major legislative initiatives.  Its members all are appointed by the Coun-
cil based on proposals by the Member States.  The decision of which groups to 
appoint, therefore, appears to be political.  However, ten years ago, a national associa-
tion of pensioners attempted to challenge the Italian government’s proposal of a group 
of associations that did not include the pensioners’ association.  The Court of First In-
stance (CFI) denied locus standi, because no retiree or organization representing retir-
ees would be distinctly and individually affected in a manner different from the rest of 
the class of retirees.28  Unlike the Oleificio Borelli case, the applicant also challenged 
the decision before a national administrative court, arguing that even though the ap-
pointment was officially by the Council, decisionmaking power was effectively being 
exercised by the Italian authorities. The Italian court disagreed and denied jurisdic-
tion.29  Once again, therefore, the mixed character of the proceeding compromised ju-
dicial protection and individual rights. 
C. “Hybrid” Proceedings 
Other issues of effectiveness and accountability arise from other proceedings, 
which include some elements belonging to “top-down” proceedings and others be-
 
 25. The Court of Justice has interpreted the regulation to mean that every modification of the specifications 
requires that the Community procedure be carried out.  Joined Cases C-129/97 & C-130/97, Criminal proceed-
ings against Yvon Chiciak and Fromagerie Chiciak (C-129/97) and Jean-Pierre Fol (C-130/97), 1998 E.C.R. I-
3315. 
 26. Council Regulation 2081/92, supra note 23, art. 7(5). 
 27. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, art. 257, 1997 O.J. (C 340) [hereinafter EC 
TREATY]. 
 28. Case T-381/94, Sindacato pensionati italiani e altri v. Council, 1995 E.C.R. II-2741. 
 29. Trib. ammin. reg. Lazio, sez. 1, 10 jun. 1998, n. 1904, RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTTO PUBBLICO 
COMUNITARIO 193 (1999). 
